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Urban and Rural Differences in Utilization of State Earned Income Tax Credit Programs:  
Minnesota’s Experience  
by 




This paper examines utilization rates of Minnesota’s earned income tax credit program by 
households on welfare from 1992 through 1999.  We examine urban and rural differences in the 
rate of filing an income tax return and receiving the earned income tax credit.  Tabulations show 
that urban areas have the lowest utilization rates, but are catching up in both income tax filing 
rates and earned income credit receipt rates.  Regression analyses identify correlates to urban-
rural differences.  A modeling exercise examines how urban and rural households might respond 
to a 10 percent increase in the credit.  Finally, policy suggestions are offered, which are relevant 
to urban and rural areas and are appropriate for other states. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
State earned income credits are an important component to the portfolio of policies that help 
families on welfare.  They supplement the earnings of low-income working households, which, 
in turn, provide these families with an incentive to work. In most states the credit is refundable, 
which means more money in the pockets of households that receive a refund when the amount of 
credit exceeds any taxes owed.  These earned income credits are relevant to welfare reform since 
the work incentive is limited to lower income households, the incentive may encourage families 
to seek work and thereby meet the work requirements. Also, earned income credits may help 
families pay for basic necessities while transitioning off of welfare.  The federal government 
facilitates the implementation of these credits by allowing states to pay for the credit with related 
funds from the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program.  A fundamental 
concern in the evaluation of these programs is that low-income households must file an income 
tax return to claim the credit and many fail to do so, even when it is to their financial advantage.   
                                                 
1 The authors are respectively from the Research Department, Minnesota House of Representatives, and the 
Department of Applied Economics at the University of Minnesota.  We thank Scott Allard, Bruce Weber, Bonnie 
Esposito, and Clyde Thurston for their helpful comments.   2
This paper examines the percentage of households who are on welfare and receive 
Minnesota’s Working Family Credit, a state earned income credit.  Differences across urban and 
rural areas are examined with respect to utilization of the credit, response to an increase in the 
credit amount, and demographic characteristics correlated with lower utilization of the credit.  
The analysis is conducted with a unique and extensive administrative database of all families 
who received welfare in Minnesota from 1992 through 1999.  Knowledge about urban-rural 
differences in utilization rates might better inform analysts, legislators, and other scholarly 
observers about who benefits from the credit and whether these benefits are distributed evenly 
across geographic regions.  This may facilitate policy discussions on earned income credits.  
Also, it may help policymakers consider the role of urban and rural places in developing low-
income tax credit policy. 
Research on Minnesota’s earned income credit program, the Working Family Credit, is 
particularly useful for several reasons.  The credit was implemented in 1991, which allows for a 
lengthy time series.  As in many other states, Minnesota’s credit is a refundable credit; 
households receive a refund if the credit exceeds taxes owed.   Also, like other states, it is 
partially paid for with grant money from TANF.  What distinguishes Minnesota’s credit from the 
federal and other state credits is that Minnesota switched from a straight percentage of the 
federal credit to a two-tier credit in 1998.  This paper provides information on whether changes 
in the second tier are correlated with a higher proportion of income tax filers and Working 
Family Credit recipients. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
As of 2003, 16 states and the District of Columbia offered an earned income tax credits 
(see table 1).  Nine of those states and the District of Columbia have implemented their earned   3
income credit programs since 1996.
2  Colorado would make it ten states, but its credit was 
enacted with a budgetary requirement that prevented offering the credit in tax years 2002, 2003, 
and 2004.  Virginia enacted a credit in 2004 and will implement it in tax year 2006.   
Twelve states and the District of Columbia offer a refundable credit.
3  TANF-related 
funds, including grant money or the associated maintenance of effort may be appropriated for the 
refundable portion of the credit.
4  Also, the credit does not qualify as assistance and subsequently 
does not subject households to the 60-month time limit. 
Some suggest that federal and state earned income credits contributed to the success of 
welfare reform. Danziger et al. (2002) suggest that the combination of a tighter labor market, a 
higher minimum wage, an increase in medical insurance for children, an increase in childcare 
subsidies, and an increased earned income credit helped make work pay.  Several found that 
increases in the earned income credit raises employment rates of low-income households, 
especially that of single mothers (Ellwood 2000, Meyer and Rosenbaum 2000, Blank and 
Schmidt 2001, Grogger 2003).   Neumark and Wascher (2001) report a positive correlation 
between higher state-earned income credits and the proportion of households with incomes that 
exceed the poverty guidelines.  Smeeding, Ross-Phillips, and O’Connor found that the majority 
of households planned to use the credit to make economic or social mobility purchases like 
paying for moving expenses or purchasing an automobile.  
Utilization of Earned Income Credits 
 
Even with such impressive outcomes, not all news is good news when it comes to earned 
income credits.  Some households miscalculate their receipt of the federal earned income credit.  
For example, McCubbin (1996) reports an error rate of 25.8 percent.   Part of the reason for 
                                                 
2 Rhode Island offered a refundable credit in 2003.  Before that, Rhode Island did not explicitly have a credit, but 
instead allowed individuals to subtract the federal earned income credit from their taxable income.     4
noncompliance originates from a complex set of rules on what qualifies as a child for earned 
income credit purposes.   
Another issue is whether all eligible participants receive the credit.  Scholz (1994) and 
others examine what’s known as the participation rate, the percent of those eligible for the credit 
who also receive the credit.  Scholz (1994) estimated that 80 to 86 percent of eligible taxpayers 
received the credit in 1990.
5  Factors correlated with a higher probability of nonparticipation 
include receipt of Social Security or public assistance, larger families, single households, and 
households of Spanish origin.  The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) (2001) estimates 75 
percent of eligible households claimed the credit.  Using simple tabulations they find that 
participation rates decreased with increased family size.  For households with no qualifying 
dependent, the participation rate was 45 percent.  For households with one qualifying dependent, 
the participation rate was 96 percent.  Then, as the number of qualifying dependents increased, 
participation rates diminished.  For families with three or more children, the participation rate 
fell to 63 percent.  Of those eligible but not participating, households without dependents made 
up 60 percent, and households with three or more children, 28 percent.   
When examining welfare households, participation rates may be lower.  Hill et al. (1999) 
estimate a lower participation rate.  Between 42 and 54 percent of single households on Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in California participated in the federal earned 
income credit.  Married households claimed the credit at a rate closer to the national statistics 
with 61 to 84 percent. 
Similarly, lower usage rates for welfare recipients were found in a five-state sample 
survey of TANF recipients and TANF leavers.  Although sample sizes for each state were 
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Vermont, Washington, D.C., and Wisconsin.    
4 45 C.F.R §260.20 (1999) and C.F.R. § 260.33 (1999).  5
relatively small, from 782 to 1,750, the results loosely corroborate with Hill et al (1999).  Of 
current employed TANF recipients, 43 percent in New Mexico, 38 percent in North Carolina, 
and 41 percent in San Bernardino, California, ever used the credit.  Of employed TANF leavers, 
45 percent in New Mexico, 67 percent in North Carolina, and 62 percent in South Carolina ever 
used the credit.  In Illinois, 56 percent of employed TANF applicants ever used the credit.  These 
percentages are even lower when counting all recipients instead of only households who are 
employed.  The study also notes that awareness and use of the credit is particularly low for 
Hispanics, Native Americans, and high school dropouts (Richardson 2002).  
There are many potential explanations for not participating in the earned income credit.  
Households may have incomplete information.  For example, they may be unaware of legislative 
changes that increased the amount of the credit.  They may be uncertain whether they qualify for 
the credit, or they may be unaware that the credit even exists.  Within Minnesota there have been 
several efforts to inform potential recipients of the credit, but even with these efforts, it is still 
possible that parents are not completely aware of the credit.   
Besides a lack of information, another reason people don’t participate is the time it takes 
to self-prepare a tax form or, alternatively, the money it costs to pay a tax preparer (Scholz 
1994).  A survey of paid preparers found that most, 38 out of 60, charged $75 to $100 for a 1040 
form (Berube et al. 2002).  In the Washington, D.C. area, the cost to prepare a tax form, 
electronically file the form, and purchase a $1,500 refund anticipation loan (RAL) was estimated 
at $189.  The high price that parents pay may illustrate the lengths to which they may go to avoid 
preparing a tax form.  Self-preparing a form may be particularly burdensome for low-income 
families.  Barriers related to language and math skills may make it less likely that these parents 
file a tax return. 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 Taxpayers are individual filing units as best determined by federal tax and SIPP data.  In 1990, the federal   6
There is sparse information regarding urban and rural differences in utilization rates.  
Berube and Thatcher (2004) examine the urban-rural variation of federal earned income credit 
filers.  They map the percent of filers who claim the credit to all federal income tax filers.  The 
resultant contours show peaks where high percentages of families claim the credit in large central 
cities and rural counties.  They suggest the peaks represent areas where there are higher 
concentrations of working poor families.  They use this evidence to suggest that more states 
consider implementing a state earned income credit.         
HISTORY OF LEGISLATION RELEVANT TO LOW-INCOME FAMILIES 
Fundamental to a parent’s decision to work, file an income tax return, and claim the 
credit are the rules that govern taxes, tax credits, and public assistance programs.  Changes in tax 
rates or credit parameters can provide an incentive to work, which in turn can induce parents to 
file income taxes and receive the credit.  In the years covered by our dataset, Minnesota’s 
legislature enacted several changes relevant to low-income families.    Table 2 summarizes the 
major legislative enactments, which include increases in the state’s earned income credit, welfare 
reform, and decreases in income tax rates in 1999. 
One prominent reform was to Minnesota’s Working Family Credit in 1998.  Precipitated 
by high marginal tax rates, legislators enacted a two-tier Working Family Credit.
6  The former 
single-tier credit imposed an interval along the phaseout of the credit in which increased wages 
resulted in decreased after-tax, after-transfer income (Hirasuna and Manzi 1997).  After the 
reform, budgets showed no decrease in income with the phaseout of the credit (Wilson 2000). 
The 1997 and 1998 Working Family Credit levels for households with two or more 
children are shown in figure 1.  Dollar amounts of the credits are listed in real 2002 dollars.  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
government mailed checks to those eligible, making eligible filing units automatic recipients.   7
reform in 1998 increased the maximum credit from $541 to $1,257.  With these reforms, the 
state maintains the same income eligibility range as the federal credit.  To do so, it adjusts 
parameters to the credit like the phase-out rate of the credit.  The appendix provides several 
examples that illustrate how the two-tier credit is calculated. 
These changes in the tax and benefit structure for low-income households provide for a 
rich analysis.  Changes in credit parameters may be examined for their impact upon filing rates 
for income taxes and receipt rates for the Working Family Credit.   
DESCRIPTION OF DATA   
To construct a database for this analysis, we merge four separate datasets into a single, 
more comprehensive file.  Data on AFDC and Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP) is 
retrieved from the Minnesota Department of Human Services.  Starting in 1992 and ending in 
1999, the data includes every eligible adult with AFDC or MFIP-eligible children.  Data from 
state income tax records come from the Minnesota Department of Revenue.
7  Data on individual 
wages come from the Minnesota wage detail file.  Data on wages in local labor markets come 
from covered employment statistics (ES-202).  The last two datasets are from the Minnesota 
Department of Economic Security.   
AFDC and MFIP data were merged with income tax records and individual wage records 
via Social Security numbers. Individual wage records were only available from 1995 through 
1999, so analysis with this dataset excludes previous years.  Data on the percent change in wages 
were merged based upon the household’s local labor market area, and residence was based upon 
the most recent information from AFDC or MFIP records as of the end of each year.
8
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Local labor market data were used to compute the percent change in local wages, which 
were used as proxy for changes in job opportunities and wages from the previous year.  It was 
expected that higher wages would increase the probability that a households find a job or receive 
enough of a pay increase to make it likely that the household would file a Minnesota tax return.      
The constructed dataset includes a dummy variable that indicates whether the household 
head or its spouse filed a tax return and whether they received the Working Family Credit.
9  Each 
record is a household’s record if a parent receives welfare for one or more months during that 
year.  If families receive welfare in more than one year, separate household records are listed for 
each year.  For example, if the household received welfare in 1994 and 1998, then two records 
will be listed for the household, one for 1994 and the other for 1998. 
Even with this rich and detailed dataset, there are some issues that this paper will not be 
able to address.  One is the role of withholding in the probability a household files an income tax 
return.  Households where employers may have withheld too much in taxes may be more likely 
to receive a refund and more likely to file a tax return.  Determination of withholding partly 
depends upon withholding guidelines by the state and upon how many allowances parents claim 
in their W-4 form.
10  We were not allowed access to W-4 forms or to the amount of refund 
received by parents, so we cannot explicitly include refunds.  Instead, such behavior will be 
implicitly included in our regression model.  Another issue is what the data does not include:  
                                                 
9 A household head is the parent in single-parent families and the male parent in two-parent families.  On several 
occasions the entire household consisted of minors.  If the oldest person in the family is at least 14 years older than 
the youngest child, that person is the household head.  If no household head could be found, then the data was 
excluded from the analysis.  A total of 645 cases, less than 0.3 percent of all cases, fit into this category and were 
dropped from the file. 
10 We investigated the possibility of whether the number of jobs a parent holds may serve as an indicator of over-
withholding.  On one hand, guidelines for employers to withhold for income taxes do not account for multiple 
jobholders.  In such a case, employers may under-withhold if parent(s) work multiple jobs.  This is because their 
income from any one employer would be less than their total income.  Each employer may be withholding at a lower 
income bracket than the parent actually falls within.  The other possibility is that the W-4 form calls for adjustments 
for multiple jobholders, which may result in over-withholding.  We constructed a budget model examining several 
scenarios of withholding and were unable to find any consistent relationship between the number of jobs and the 
refund from their state income tax return.   9
Unless parents file an income tax return or receive covered wages, there are geographic 
identifiers.  This may have policy relevance, since part of the success of welfare reform may 
depend upon whether parents can achieve self-sufficiency after leaving welfare.  However, 
utilization by current welfare families is still useful in that it may help them meet work 
requirements and achieve self-sufficiency while on welfare.   
DATA ANALYSIS 
This section tabulates the percent of households that file an income tax return, the percent 
that receive the Working Family Credit, and the percent of households eligible for the credit that 
actually receive the credit.  These percentages give an idea of how many are taking advantage of 
the income supplement.  
The paper draws upon a sub-state construct used by Berube and Thatcher (2004) with 
four regions: central counties of Minneapolis-St. Paul, suburban counties of Minneapolis-St. 
Paul, smaller metropolitan counties, and rural counties.   The central counties of Minneapolis-St. 
Paul are Hennepin and Ramsey.  The suburban counties are all remaining counties within the 
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.
11   Smaller metropolitan counties are the remaining 
Minnesota metropolitan areas of Duluth-Superior, Grand Forks-Fargo-Moorhead, La Crosse-
Rochester, and St. Cloud.  Rural counties are all nonmetropolitan counties.  The rural county 
category was not constructed to suggest that all nonmetropolitan counties are rural in nature, or 
that all rural counties are similar in characteristics.  Certainly more complicated categorization 
schemes can more aptly capture the complicated geographical panoply of urban and rural 
communities.  However, for purposes of this paper, a simpler set of categories help limit the 
scope of analysis.  It also allows for consistency with previous analyses similar to this subject. 
                                                 
11 The nine remaining counties are Anoka, Carver, Chisago, Dakota, Isanti, Scott, Sherburne, Washington, and 
Wright.  Berube and Thatcher (2004) use central cities instead of counties.  We do not have access to municipality-
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Table 3 lists the percent of AFDC and MFIP households who filed an income tax return, 
who received the Working Family Credit, and who received the credit among those eligible.   
The percentages include observations for each year from 1992 through 1999.  Suburban 
Minneapolis-St. Paul and rural counties have a higher percentage of households filing income 
taxes and receiving the credit when counting only households eligible for the credit.  Households 
from the central counties of Minneapolis-St. Paul are least likely to file an income tax return or 
receive the credit.   
The tables show that some households that file an income tax return do not receive the 
credit.  For example, from the central counties of Minneapolis-St. Paul, 41.6 percent of 
households filed an income tax return and 35.2 percent of filers receive the Working Family 
Credit.  Part of the remaining 6.4 percent who filed, but did not receive the credit have too much 
in wages to qualify for the credit.   
When looking only at those eligible for the credit, it is useful to note that eligibility is 
determined by employment covered under the unemployment insurance program.  This is an 
incomplete measure of eligibility since it excludes wages from some small employers and self-
employed persons.  However, the participation rates are similar to those found by Hill et al. 
(1999). 
The tables show that urban and rural receipt rates increased over time and that the 
difference in rates converged.  In 1992, the percent of central Minneapolis-St. Paul households 
that did not receive the credit was 14.9 percentage points lower than rural households.  By 1999, 
the difference reduced to 4.8 percentage points.  At least some of the convergence relates to a 
catch-up in the participation rate among eligible households in the central counties of 
Minneapolis-St. Paul.  From 1995 through 1999, the participation rate for central Minneapolis-
St. Paul counties increased from 53.9 to 61.0 percent.     11
In summarizing these tabulations it is useful to note that as with any regional categorical 
scheme, there is a distribution of rates across counties within each category.  For example, there 
are six counties with lower filing percentages than Hennepin County.  Three of the six are rural 
have counties and may be related to the fact that they have significant Indian reservations with 
higher poverty rates within their political boundaries.   
REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
This section includes estimates of three different probabilities.  The probability of: filing 
an income tax return; of receiving the credit; and of receiving the credit when eligible in terms of 
covered wages.  When estimating the probability that households file an income tax return, we 
include all households eligible for welfare during the year regardless of eligibility for the credit.  
This adds information for comparing participation rate regressions of only eligible households 
since households may respond to the credit and to their surprise, end up with too much income to 
qualify for the credit.  At that wage level, they will be required to file a tax return.  Regressions 
on the probability of receipt of the credit among all other families are conducted because it 
includes those parents who do not work even when there is an increase in the credit.  These are 
parents who opt-out of the credit because they have other sources of income or because they are 
unable to find a job.  Finally, regressions on the probability of receipt of the credit with only 
those eligible are included because it helps uncover the behavior of those who choose not to 
receive the credit even when they are eligible.   
The effect of Minnesota’s earned income credit is modeled with the maximum amount of 
credit.  When the state changed the credit, it often changed all the parameters, which makes 
individual parameters highly correlated.  Nonetheless, it is useful to test whether households   12
respond to the individual parameters in a manner consistent with economic expectations.
12  Each 
of the regressions includes a model specification with the maximum credit only and with all the 
parameters to the credit.     
Independent variables are listed in table 4 along with their means and standard deviations.  
For individual parameters, maximum credits for the first and second tiers and phase-in and 
phase-out floors are adjusted to real 2002 dollars.  Only phase-in and phase-out rates are left 
unadjusted, which makes possible cross-year comparisons, where real wages and the parameters 
implicitly determine the credit amount in real dollars.   
Test for Regional Differences 
This section tests for regional differences in the probability that households file an 
income tax return or receive the credit.  Logit regressions are conducted to estimate the 
probabilities conditioned upon demographic characteristics, policy changes, and structural 
economic conditions.  Table 5 lists the resultant coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.   
The first two columns list the results of estimating the probability of filing an M-1 
income tax return.  The M-1 is the standard form filed by most Minnesota residents.  Even after 
accounting for demographic characteristics, local job market conditions, and policy variables, the 
fixed effects for regions remain statistically significant.  In comparison to the central counties of 
Minneapolis-St. Paul:  (1) households from rural counties are 2.4 to 2.7 times more likely to file; 
(2) households from suburban counties are 1.6 to 1.7 times more likely to file; and (3) 
households from smaller metropolitan counties are 1.5 to 1.6 times more likely to file.  These 
remaining regional differences might be for several reasons.  Examples include differences in the 
distribution of wages paid by local job opportunities, differences in state-to-state migration of 
                                                 
12 Previous studies did not examine the impact of individual credit parameters.  Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000) use a 
weighted average of taxes paid.  Neumark and Wascher (2001) use the state’s percentage of the federal earned 
income credit.  Grogger (2004) uses the phase-in rate and the maximum credit.     13
welfare recipients, differences in information about the credit, and differences in access to low-
cost tax preparation assistance.
13   
With respect to Working Family Credit parameters, an increase in the maximum credit 
increases the probability of filing an income tax return.  For individual parameters, the estimated 
coefficients are largely in accordance with economic expectations.  The phase-in rate, which 
raises the amount of the credit during phase-in, is positive and statistically significant.  The first-
tier maximum credit raises the credit for households with earnings within this range and is 
positive and statistically significant.  An increase in the phase-in rate for the second tier raises 
the credit amount and the coefficient is positive, but not statistically significant.  A higher phase-
in floor to the second tier postpones the increase to a higher credit. And the coefficient is 
negative and statistically significant.  The second-tier maximum credit is positive and 
statistically significant.  The phase-out floor raises the amount of earnings needed before the 
credit begins to phase out from its second-tier maximum; as expected, it is positive and 
significant.  A higher phase-out rate lowers the credit amount to zero at lower income levels.  
The coefficient is negative and statistically significant. 
In 1998, Minnesota implemented MFIP, the state’s version of TANF cash grants, which 
included a 60-month time limit, work requirements, sanctions, incorporation of food stamp 
benefits, and a new childcare subsidy program.
14  In that same year, the state implemented its 
two-tier credit for tax year 1998.  The credit reduced high marginal tax rates imposed during the 
phaseout of the single-tier credit.  Fixed effects, which are used to account for the 1998 reforms, 
are positive and statistically significant.  This might imply that the other variables largely capture 
the expected effects of the reform and the fixed effects capture any remaining residual effects.     
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differences even after accounting for a number of other variables. 
14 Some of these aspects were included in Minnesota’s JOBS program.   14
In 1999, the state lowered income tax rates for the high, medium, and low-income 
brackets.  Lower rates provide an incentive to work, which may result in increased household 
eligibility for the credit, or an increase in those required to file an income tax return.  To avoid 
perfect multi-collinearity, a single fixed effect was used to represent the decrease in tax rates for 
all three brackets.  The estimated coefficient   (REFORM99) is negative and statistically 
significant, which is opposite to our expectations.  The reason might be related to the fact that 
filing rates decreased in 1999, which was the same year that the economy began to fall back into 
recession.  One year of data may be insufficient to separate tax cuts from a faltering economy. 
The demographic characteristics are consistent in sign and significance for both filing 
regressions.  Households with Asian American household heads are less likely to file.  This 
might be because a significant proportion of Asian Americans on MFIP are East Asian 
immigrants. Between January 1997 and August 2000, more than 46 percent of Asian Americans 
eligible for welfare were immigrants.   In this group, 93 percent cited their nationality as 
Cambodian, Hmong, ethnic Laotian, or Vietnamese.  These parents may suffer from language 
barriers and skill deficits that make it difficult to find a job and fill out an income tax return.   
Households with African American household heads are less likely to file in comparison 
to whites.  Lower filing probabilities may partly explain the lower aggregate filing rates depicted 
in table 3 in central counties of Minneapolis-St. Paul where African Americans are 
disproportionately located and suffer the indignities of segregated poverty (e.g., Wilson 1990).  
These families may be less likely to be employed and file an income tax return.  
Hispanics are less likely to file.  These families include migrant farm laborers who come 
to Minnesota in summer months and leave in the fall.  Welfare caseloads in some Minnesota 
counties are resultantly cyclical with an upswing in May-June and a drop-off in September-
October.  This is not surprising when as many as 70 percent of the families on welfare in some   15
counties have a Hispanic household head.  Migrant farm laborers would likely be required to file 
a nonresident income tax return, which is not included in this data.  Accordingly, Hispanic 
households may still be receiving the Working Family Credit; they may just be applying for 
them through a different income tax form.  Still Hispanic rural families may be less likely to file 
since migrant laborers have only summer earnings and their credit may resultantly be small.  
Moreover, Hispanics that remain in Minnesota may be less likely to be employed and may more 
likely lack the language or educational skills necessary to fill out an income tax form.   
American Indians are less likely to file.  This might be because families who live and 
work solely on reservations are not required to file a state income tax return and are ineligible for 
Minnesota’s Working Family Credit.  Not all American Indians work and live on reservations, 
but there may be a large proportion, especially in more remote rural counties.    
Married parents are more likely to file.  Household heads without a high school diploma 
serve as an indicator of employment skills and are negatively correlated with filing an income 
tax return.  Families with more children are less likely to file.  Parents from these families may 
have little time to search for employment, less time to form the employment networks needed to 
hear about an opportunity, and less time to fill out an income tax form.  Having more children 
may also be spuriously correlated with other indicators such as lower educational attainment 
rates.  As expected, households with older children are more likely to file, which might be 
because the children are more independent with less need for childcare.  Age of the parent, an 
indicator of experience and job skills, is unexpectedly negative and statistically significant.  This 
might be because the age of the children largely captures most of the skill effects.  Or, older 
parents on welfare may be strapped with more significant employment barriers.  Female 
household heads are correlated with a higher probability of filing.     16
Regional fixed effects were multiplied against percent changes in aggregate wages in the 
local labor market.  This was done to account for regional differences in households’ response to 
job growth.  The largest response to a percent increase in aggregate wages is within the central 
counties of Minneapolis-St. Paul.  The smallest is within rural counties where the coefficient 
indicates a slightly negative response to an increase in aggregate ages, but does not appear to be 
statistically different from zero.   
Regressions 3 and 4 in table 5 list the results of estimating the probability of receiving the 
Working Family Credit for all households regardless of eligibility.  Households from rural 
counties are 2.1 to 2.3 times more likely to receive the credit compared to households in the 
central counties of Minneapolis-St. Paul.  Households in smaller metropolitan counties and in 
suburban counties of Minneapolis-St. Paul are both 1.4 to 1.5 times as likely to receive the credit.     
The policy parameters are similar to the previous regression.  The estimated coefficients 
for the maximum credit, phase-in rate, phase-in floor, maximum credits for tier one and tier two, 
phase-out floor, and phase-out rate are all as expected.  Only the phase-in rate to the second tier 
is negative, which might be related to a high degree of multicollinearity between parameters.  
The maximum credit in regression 4 is positively related with receiving the credit.   
Regressions 5 and 6 in table 5 examine the probability of receiving the credit among 
households eligible for the credit as determined by covered wages.  Households from rural 
counties are 1.5 times as likely to receive the credit as households from the central counties of 
Minneapolis-St. Paul.  Households from smaller metropolitan counties are 1.1 to 1.2 times as 
likely.  Households from suburban counties are 1.1 times as likely. 
The maximum credits for tier one and tier two, phase-in floor to tier two, phase-out floor, 
and the phase-out rate are all statistically significant with the expected sign.  Like the previous 
regressions, the phase-in rate to the second tier is with an unexpected negative sign.  All but two   17
of the remaining statistically significant coefficients carry the same signs as before.  Unlike the 
previous regressions, Asian Americans and older parents are more likely to receive the credit 
when eligible.   
Filing an Income Tax Return 
This section reports the results of regressions on the probability of filing an income tax 
return for each individual region.  Region-by-region regressions were motivated out of concern 
over an inability to identify any regional variation in response to policy parameters, demographic 
characteristics, and economic conditions.  Motivation for the regressions on the probability of 
filing an income tax return was because of residual benefits not captured by the other 
regressions.   
Table 6 shows that a higher maximum credit increases the probability that AFDC or 
MFIP households file an income tax return.  The largest coefficient is for suburban Minneapolis-
St. Paul counties.  The smallest is for smaller metropolitan counties.   
When statistically significant, the individual parameters are consistent with expectations.  
A higher phase-in rate to tier one, higher maximum credit for tier one, lower phase-in floor to 
tier two, higher maximum credit for tier two, higher phase-out floor, and lower phase-out rate are 
all estimated to increase the probability of filing an income tax return.  The 1998 reform is 
positively correlated with filing an income tax return and statistically significant in all but one of 
the regressions for smaller metropolitan counties.  The 1999 income tax decrease is unexpectedly 
negative and statistically significant in all but one regression.   
There are regional differences in response to demographic characteristics and the percent 
change in wages.  Asian Americans are 0.8 times as likely to file as whites in rural counties and 
are slightly more likely than whites in smaller metropolitan counties, but the coefficient in the 
latter is not statistically different from zero.  Hispanics in smaller metropolitan counties are 0.5   18
times as likely to file as whites, and in the central counties of Minneapolis-St. Paul, they are 0.9 
times as likely as whites.  The difference might partly be because households from rural counties 
are more likely to be migrant farm laborers.  American Indians in rural counties are 0.2 times as 
likely to file as whites and 0.6 times as likely to file in suburban Minneapolis-St. Paul counties.  
The lower filing rates in rural counties might be because of American Indians living and working 
on reservations.  Female heads are 1.4 times as likely to file as males in central Minneapolis-St. 
Paul counties and equally likely in smaller metropolitan counties. The percent change in 
aggregate wages in the local labor market is positive and statistically significant in all regions 
except rural counties.  The largest coefficient is for the central counties of Minneapolis-St. Paul 
and the smallest is for rural counties.   
Working Family Credit Receipt:  All Families Regardless of Eligibility for the Credit 
Table 7 lists the results of regressions on the probability a household receives the 
Working Family Credit.  These regressions are different from the other regressions in that they 
identify the probability of all households to actually receive the credit.  Whereas the previous 
regression may include some parents who respond to increases in the credit but end up with too 
much in wages to actually receive the credit.  Also, these regressions differ from the next set of 
regressions, which selects only eligible households and examines correlates to participation.  
These regressions include parents who do not receive the credit in response to an increase in the 
credit, either because they have other sources of income, or they could not find a job.   
The maximum credit, which in 1999 could deposit as much as $1,321 in the pockets of 
working families, is positive and statistically significant for all regressions.
15  The largest 
coefficient is for suburban counties in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area.  The smallest 
coefficient is for rural Minnesota.  For regressions with individual Working Family Credit 
                                                 
15 Maximum credit for tier 2 in 2002 dollars.   19
parameters, all statistically significant coefficients carry the expected sign, which indicates that a 
larger credit increases the probability of receipt.     
There are additional differences across regions with respect to demographic groups and 
aggregate wages.  Asian Americans are 0.7 times as likely to receive the credit as whites in rural 
counties and approximately equally likely in smaller metropolitan counties.  African Americans 
are 0.7 times as likely to receive the credit in rural counties and 0.9 times as likely in the central 
counties of Minneapolis-St. Paul.  Hispanics are 0.6 times as likely to receive the credit in 
smaller metropolitan counties and only slightly less likely to in the central counties of 
Minneapolis-St. Paul (0.9 to 1.0 times as likely, but the difference is not statistically significant).  
American Indians are least likely to receive the credit in rural counties (0.3 times compared to 
whites), and they are 0.7 times as likely in suburban counties of Minneapolis-St. Paul.  Female 
heads in smaller metropolitan counties are just as likely to receive the credit as males.  
Alternatively, in central Minneapolis-St. Paul counties, females are 1.5 times as likely as males.  
All other demographic characteristics are similar in sign and statistical significance as before.   
When looking at the percent change in aggregate wages, the estimated coefficients are 
positive and statistically significant except for rural counties.  The biggest increase is for the 
central counties of Minneapolis-St. Paul when using the maximum credit and for the smaller 
metropolitan counties when using individual parameters.   
The Probability of Receipt of the Working Family Credit Among Those Eligible in Terms 
of Covered Wages 
Table 8 extends the analysis to the contribution of policy, demographic, and economic 
variables to the probability of receipt of the Working Family Credit when selecting only eligible 
participants.  Our data corroborate with work by Hill et al. (1999) and find that a substantial 
proportion of households do not receive the Working Family Credit even though they may be   20
eligible.  The analysis here identifies eligible households with covered employment statistics, 
which is less rigorous than previous analyses because it does not include income from 
noncovered employment.
16  However, the overall tabulations appear consistent with prior 
analyses. 
As expected, an increase in the maximum credit results in a higher probability of receipt.  
The largest response is in suburban counties of Minneapolis-St. Paul.  The smallest estimated 
coefficient is from rural counties, although the difference is not very large.  For individual 
parameters many of the coefficients were not significant with most of the statistically significant 
coefficients within the regression for the central counties of Minneapolis-St. Paul.  The 
statistically significant estimated coefficients are almost all of the expected sign except for the 
phase-in rate to the second tier.  The lack of statistical significance for the other regions may be 
because sample sizes are smaller.  The largest of these regressions was for the rural counties, 
which included 56,006 observations.  This is smaller than any of the regressions in the previous 
sections.   
The reforms in 1998 were inconsistent in sign across the regions.  It was positive and 
statistically significant in the central counties of Minneapolis-St. Paul, but negative and 
statistically significant in the suburban counties of Minneapolis St. Paul and in smaller 
metropolitan areas.  The reform in 1999 was positive and statistically significant in the central 
counties of Minneapolis-St. Paul, which is consistent with our expectations of higher receipt 
rates. 
The demographic coefficients are largely similar to the results in the previous 
regressions.  What is different in these regressions is that Asian Americans are more likely to 
                                                 
16 Scholz (1994) uses SIPP data to determine eligibility.  Examining current welfare recipients, Hill et al. use self-
reported income to county welfare agents, California unemployment insurance data, and taxable income by source   21
receive the credit if they are eligible in terms of covered wages.  Households in rural counties are 
1.3 times more likely than whites.  Households in the central counties of Minneapolis-St. Paul 
are 2.2 times more likely.  Also, older parents are now more likely to receive the credit.  The 
results might imply that these households are less likely to be employed, but when they are, they 
are more likely to file income taxes and receive the credit.  Simple tabulations verify that these 
parents are less likely to be employed.  Asian American household heads listed in this dataset are 
0.7 times as likely to be employed as whites.  Household heads 50 and older are 0.6 times as 
likely to be employed as household heads under 50.    
An increase in aggregate wages results in a decrease in the probability of receipt of the 
credit in rural counties and an increase in smaller metropolitan counties.  There might be many 
reasons for the negative coefficient, which includes the possibility that wage growth in rural 
counties allowed an increasing proportion of families to find work that paid wages above the 
working family credit limits.  This corroborates with the data on the percent of parents that file 
an income tax return.  In 1995, the first year we could determine eligibility, 5.8 percent of 
welfare recipients filed an income tax, but did not receive the earned income credit.  By 1999, 
8.7 percent filed, but did not receive the earned income credit.   
MODELING AN INCREASE IN THE MAXIMUM CREDIT 
 
This section conducts a brief modeling exercise to estimate the percent change in income 
tax filing rates and Working Family Credit receipt rates due to a 10 percent increase in the 
maximum credit.  The exercise helps identify what might happen if the state raised the earned 
income credit.  We also examine whether changes to the credit disproportionately benefits any of 
the four regions.       
                                                                                                                                                             
from federal income tax records.  This study uses only wage detail data from covered employment statistics, but it 
includes former welfare recipients who will not have such earned income records on administrative welfare data.       22
In 1999, a 10 percent increase in the maximum credit would amount to a $5 increase in 
the maximum credit for households with no dependents, $62 for households with one dependent, 
and $122 for households with two or more dependents (these are nominal dollars unadjusted for 
inflation).  Table 9 shows that the response ranges from income tax filing rates would increase 
by 2.2 to 3.4 percent.  When considering all households, receipt rates increase from 3.3 to 4.5 
percent.  When selecting only eligible households, receipt rates ranged from 1.3 to 2.0 percent.  
In all of these estimates, the largest response was in the central counties of Minneapolis-St. Paul 
and the smallest response was within smaller metropolitan counties. 
POLICY CONCLUSIONS 
 
State earned income credits can help low-income families make ends meet by boosting 
their after-tax incomes.  Acting as an earnings supplement, the credit effectively raises net after-
tax wages and provides an incentive to work.  To receive the credit, households must file an 
income tax return and not all households do so, even when it may be in their best interest.   
This paper finds substantial urban and rural differences in receipt of Minnesota’s 
Working Family Credit by current AFDC and MFIP recipients.  The central counties of 
Minnesota’s largest metropolitan area, Minneapolis-St. Paul, has the lowest percentages of 
households who file an income tax return (41.6 percent) and who receive the credit (35.2 percent 
of all households and 61.0 percent of eligible households).  AFDC and MFIP households from 
the surrounding suburbs of Minneapolis-St. Paul file income taxes in the highest percentages 
(54.5 percent), while rural county households receive the credit in the highest percentages (46.2 
percent of all households and 68.0 percent of eligible households).   
The lower filing and receipt rates for the central counties of Minneapolis-St. Paul may in 
part be related to the low participation rates among eligible households.  The slightly higher 
filing rates, but lower receipt rates in suburban counties may be related to higher employment   23
rates and a higher percentages of parents with incomes exceeding Working Family Credit 
eligibility limits.  Similarly, lower filing rates and higher receipt rates in rural area households 
may be related to lower employment rates and a higher percentage of jobs that pay lower 
wages.
17   
Tabulations show a convergence in filing and receipt rates throughout the 1990s.  Some 
of the convergence is due to a catch-up in participation rates of eligible households within central 
Minneapolis-St. Paul. Regressions suggest some of this catching up might be related to a more 
elastic response to wage growth and an increase in the Working Family Credit.  The good 
economy of the 1990s combined with an increased credit helped make filing taxes pay in all 
regions, but particularly within central Minneapolis-St. Paul.  Another reason for the urban 
catch-up may be because of a concentrated effort of nonprofits and local and state governments 
to encourage families to take advantage of the credit.  Research by the authors finds that free tax 
preparation sites within the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area increased over time and are 
correlated with a higher probability of filing taxes and receiving the credit within central counties 
and within higher       poverty neighborhoods, but the effects are difficult to conclusively 
separate from the economy.  Another possibility is that Minnesota carried out several 
information campaigns about the credit using brochures, letters in foreign languages, radio 
announcements, television announcements, and notices on the backs of grocery bags.  These may 
have contributed to the catching up of filing and receipt rates in urban centers.  Such information 
may have proven especially useful for households that recently migrated into the central counties 
of Minneapolis-St. Paul from outside the state.  These families may enter without knowing about 
the credit, but may more quickly learn about the credit through information campaigns. 
                                                 
17 Annual average employment rates for the years 1995 through 1999 equaled 39.0 percent for the suburban counties 
of Minneapolis-St. Paul and 37.3 percent for the rural counties of Minneapolis-St. Paul.  The percent of households   24
Even after controlling for demographic conditions, policy variables, and local area wage 
growth, lower filing rates and receipt rates prevailed for the central counties of Minneapolis-St. 
Paul.  This may indicate further challenges for central cities.  Some suggest that part of this 
problem might be because filling out tax forms can be a daunting task.  This may be especially 
true for parents with math or language skill deficits or poor skills in managing their home 
finances.  Efforts might be produced to better target incentives to file and receive the credit 
directly among welfare recipients.  Minnesota already requires that county caseworkers inform 
welfare recipients of the availability of the credit.  We have evidence that this may have 
improved statewide filing and receipt rates.  The state could implement similar activities to 
improve receipt rates, like requiring parents to meet with financial social workers to help with 
their tax forms, providing childcare when families visit free tax preparation sites, and providing 
transportation to free tax preparation sites. 
The welfare population in central cities may be more transient in nature.  Some studies in 
Minnesota find that welfare families will move as many as five times within a year.  Targeting 
ways to reach such a transient population may help improve receipt rates.  Information could be 
given to recipients on entrance and exit interviews.  Within exit interviews parents might be 
reminded that they can receive the earned income credit for their years worth of earnings even if 
they move out of the state.  Also, putting more effort into getting forwarding addresses to send 
reminder letters may help boost receipt rates. 
Rural area receipt rates might further be enhanced by better information about free tax 
preparation sites.  The majority of sites in Minnesota’s rural areas are sponsored by an 
organization for retired persons.  These sites offer their tax preparation services to all families, 
but some parents may perceive these sites as primarily for older workers and remain hesitant to 
                                                                                                                                                             
with wages too high to qualify for the credit equaled 3.6 percent for suburban Minneapolis-St. Paul counties and 2.1   25
visit such sites.  Better information letting parents know that these sites will provide services 
may help improve receipt rates.   
Urban and rural differences related to the race of the household head also produce some 
substantive policy implications.  American Indians in rural counties are considerably less likely 
to take advantage of the credit.  This might be because American Indians who live and work on 
reservations are not subject to state income taxes and within Minnesota they are ineligible for the 
Working Family Credit.  This may have considerable policy implications since some of the 
nation’s worst pockets of rural poverty are within reservations.  States with reservations, 
especially within remote rural areas, may wish to consider separate means for alleviating rural 
poverty in these communities.  
Hispanics who live in rural and smaller metropolitan counties are less likely to take 
advantage of the credit.  This might in part be due to a high percentage of parents being migrant 
farm laborers.  Migrant laborers are eligible for the credit, but must file a nonresident return.  
Some parents may choose not to file because they can only apply Minnesota earnings to the 
credit, the amount of the credit may be small in comparison to the effort needed to fill out the 
forms.  Receipt rates for migrant laborers might be increased if free tax preparation sites in other 
home states monitor which states offer earned income credits.  They may be able to add a little 
more money into the pockets of these families. 
  For Asian Americans, efforts to address employment barriers may produce larger 
increases in receipt rates.  For example, a significant proportion of Asian Americans within 
Minnesota are East Asian immigrants.  Further efforts to provide language and other skills 
training may be useful.  Also, their receipt rates for eligible households are substantially lower in 
comparison to urban areas.  Some of this may have to do with a more developed network of 
                                                                                                                                                             
percent for rural counties.  Like the other statistics, this only includes covered employment.   26
nonprofits and other sources of support in urban areas.  Efforts might be taken to help all 
immigrants in general by sending out more letters in foreign languages and to work with local 
immigrant groups to encourage families to take advantage of the credit. 
More research might be conducted on the characteristics of older parents on welfare.  
Some of these parents may have disabilities or children with disabilities, which make it difficult 
for them to find employment.  Others may have significant hard or soft skill deficits in which 
training or counseling might help to find work.   
  Finally, administrative datasets like the one constructed here might be used to identify 
parents who may be eligible for the credit and are not taking advantage of it.  Letters might be 
sent to these parents notifying them of their potential eligibility.  For example, in states where the 
credit is a simple percentage of the earned income credit, or the range of the credit is the same as 
the federal credit, they may be able to merge the federal earned income credit records with state 
income tax records.  States could identify families that filed for the federal earned income credit, 
but not the state credit and send letters saying they may be eligible for the credit and direct them  
to a free tax preparation site for more information.  Directing families to free tax preparation 
sites may improve compliance rates by lowering the percentage of families that incorrectly 
calculate and claim the wrong amount of the credit. 
  There may be several avenues of further research with administrative datasets like the 
one constructed for this study.  Research on the interaction of child support, food stamps, and 
other benefits upon usage rates of the earned income credit might be examined.  States may form 
research coalitions and examine whether institutional differences in the form of the credit 
matters.  Or states may further identify the costs to enacting or expanding a state earned income 
credit. 
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Table 1.  State Earned Income Credit Programs 
By Year of Implementation 
Year 
Implemented  State 






1994 New  York 








Source:  Manzi and Michael (2003); National Conference of State 
Legislatures; and the State of Rhode Island, Taxpayer Assistance, Center 
for Budget and Policy Priorities. 
 
                                                 
18 Colorado’s earned income credit program was unavailable in 2002, 2003, and 2004 because of a law that 
disallows distribution of the credit during budget deficit years.   30
 
Table 2.  Legislative Changes Relevant to Minnesota Low-Income Families 
 
Summary of Policy Change and Date of Enactment 
Working Family Tax Credit (1992-1997).   
The credit, determined as a percent of the federal earned income credit, increased in 1994 
from 10 percent to 15 percent. 
Federal Earned Income Tax Credit (1992-1997).   
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990:  Raised the earned income credit and 
dropped the support test for qualifying children.  The increased credit amounts were phased 
in over a three-year period starting January 1, 1991.  The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1992 raised the earned income credit with increases phased in over a three-year 
period starting in 1994.  
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) (1997). 
Minnesota enacted the Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP).  Reforms included 
increased financial work incentives, increased subsidies for child care, work requirements, 
a 60-month time limit, and a statutory requirement that the county human services agency 
inform recipients of the working family credit.  Most provisions were implemented in 
1998.  The 60-month time limits went into effect beginning July 1997.  
Working Family Credit (1998).   
Minnesota enacted a two-tier credit.  The credit phases in until it reaches the first tier, 
remains flat until wages reach the phasein to the second tier, remains flat through the 
second tier, and then phases out.  The credit changed to a percentage of earnings from the 
prior percentage of the federal credit. 
Income Taxes and Working Family Credit (1999).   
Minnesota lowered tax rates for the lower, middle, and upper income brackets.  In addition, 
the working family credit percentage was increased by roughly 10 percent.  Phase-out rate 
was changed so that the credit phases out at the same income level as the federal credit. 
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Table 3.  Household Filing Rates for Minnesota Income Taxes, Receipt, and Participation Rates for Minnesota’s Working Family Credit (1992 
through 1999) 





Percent of AFDC and MFIP Households that File an Income Tax Return     
Central Counties of Minneapolis-St. Paul  29.2% 30.6% 33.3% 36.4% 39.2% 53.8% 63.6% 57.2% 41.6% 265,505 
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
Suburban Minneapolis-St. Paul  44.3% 46.6% 50.0% 52.6% 54.7% 64.5% 70.7% 67.5% 54.5% 77,314
Smaller Metropolitan  40.0% 42.1% 44.3% 46.0% 47.5% 60.1% 69.8% 66.6% 49.8% 73,944
Rural 46.9% 47.8% 49.6% 50.8% 52.3%  68.1% 61.4% 65.3% 53.7% 153,129
Percent of AFDC and MFIP Households that Received the Working Family Credit  
  Central Counties of Minneapolis-St. Paul  24.3% 26.2% 28.9% 32.5% 35.6% 41.0% 49.0% 51.8% 35.2% 265,505
Suburban Minneapolis-St. Paul  34.6% 37.7% 41.3% 44.4% 46.9% 49.7% 55.3% 56.3% 44.3% 77,314
Smaller Metropolitan  33.2% 35.8% 38.3% 40.8% 42.7% 48.3% 56.4% 58.2% 42.4% 73,944
Rural 39.2% 40.8% 43.3% 45.0% 46.8%  57.6% 50.5% 56.6% 46.2% 153,129
Percent of AFDC and MFIP Households Eligible for the Working Family Credit that Received the Credit  
  Central Counties of Minneapolis-St. Paul           53.9% 57.6% 60.5% 65.4% 67.7% 61.0% 98,841
Suburban Minneapolis-St. Paul           65.1% 67.3% 67.6% 67.8% 67.7% 67.0% 29,124
Smaller Metropolitan           66.5% 67.7% 69.9% 69.2% 71.3% 68.8% 24,240
Rural           67.1% 67.5% 67.9% 69.5% 68.1% 68.0% 56,023
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Suburban Minneapolis-St. Paul Counties (MSP)  0.1357             
  (0.342)             
Smaller Metropolitan Areas (SMETRO)  0.1298             
  (0.336)             
Nonmetropolitan Counties (NONMETRO)  0.2687             
  (0.443)             
Phase-in Rate for First Tier (RATE1) 
 
0.0477  0.047  0.046  0.046  0.049 
(0.022)         
         
           
         
         
         
           
           
         
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
First Tier Maximum Benefit in $000s (MAX1) 
 
0.4598  0.449  0.444  0.44  0.476 
(0.227) (0.225) (0.221) (0.218) (0.231)
Floor for Working Family Credit  
in $000s (WFCFLOOR)  2.6194  2.442  2.349  2.357  2.873 
(5.392) (5.239) (5.143) (5.128) (5.607)
Phase-in Rate for Second Tier (RATE2) 
 
0.0315  0.029  0.028  0.027  0.035 
(0.069) (0.066) (0.064) (0.063) (0.072)
Second Tier Maximum Benefit in $000s (MAX2) 
 
0.2091  0.194  0.184  0.182  0.233 
(0.448) (0.433) (0.421) (0.415) (0.47)
Phase-out Floor in $000s (PHOUTFL) 
 
14.9753  14.942  14.888  14.882  15.046 
(1.928) (1.878) (1.859) (1.81) (2.005)
Phase-out Rate (PHOUTRT)  0.0333  0.032  0.032  0.031  0.035 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025)
Maximum Working Family Credit  
in $000s  (MAXCRED)  0.5222  0.506  0.498  0.493  0.547 
(0.343) (0.34) (0.33) (0.32) (0.36)
Reform in 1998 (REFORM98)  0.193  0.18  0.175  0.177  0.21 
   (Switch to Two Tier Working Family Credit and  
Welfare Reform) 
(0.395) (0.385) (0.38) (0.381) (0.407)
Reform in 1999 (REFORM99)  0.0929  0.087  0.084  0.082  0.102   34
   (Lowered Income Tax Rates for all Brackets)  (0.29)  (0.282)  (0.277)  (0.275)  (0.302) 
Female    0.9017  0.865  0.855  0.926  0.929 
           
           
           
           
           
         
         
           
         
         
          
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
(0.298) (0.342) (0.352) (0.261) (0.257)
Asian American (ASIAN)   0.0599  0.013  0.036  0.023  0.104 
(0.237) (0.112) (0.186) (0.15) (0.306)
African American (AFRICAN)  0.2084  0.012  0.038  0.053  0.414 
(0.406) (0.107) (0.192) (0.224) (0.493)
Latino (HISPANIC)  0.0652  0.105  0.131  0.024  0.036 
(0.247) (0.307) (0.337) (0.153) (0.185)
Native American (AMERIND)  0.0738  0.114  0.063  0.021  0.069 
(0.262) (0.318) (0.242) (0.144) (0.254)
Did not Graduate from High School (EDUCLHS) 
 
0.2966  0.286  0.269  0.219  0.333 
(0.457) (0.452) (0.443) (0.413) (0.471)
2.4573 2.366 2.273 2.096 2.666 Number of Children  
18 or younger for that year (NCHTIME)  (1.544)  (1.397)  (1.361)  (1.172)  (1.727) 
Age of youngest child (AGECH)  5.3123  5.493  5.605  5.396  5.102 
(4.585) (4.681) (4.731) (4.52) (4.495)
Age of Household Head (AGEPAR) 
 
31.0063  31.249  31.401  30.293  30.964 
(8.401) (8.497) (8.474) (7.725) (8.5)
Ever married while on AFDC or MFIP (MARRIED) 
 
0.2732  0.338  0.355  0.231  0.225 
(0.446) (0.473) (0.478) (0.422) (0.418)
Percent Change in Aggregate Wages (PCALLJMW)  0.0669  0.063  0.056  0.088  0.066 
   (For BLS-LMA)  (0.027)  (0.035)  (0.026)  (0.023)  (0.019) 
Percent Change in Local Labor Market Wages Times  0.0169 
Suburban Minneapolis St. Paul Suburban Fixed Effect  (MSPW) (0.033) 
   
Percent Change in Local Labor Market Wages Times  0.0072 
Fixed Effect for Smaller Metropolitan Counties (SMETROW)  (0.021) 
   
Percent Change in Local Labor Market Wages Times  0.0119 
Fixed Effects for Rural Counties (NONMETW)  (0.031) 
*Standard deviations were used because standard errors are equal to 0.000 for all variables.   35
 
Table 5.  Probability of Filing an Income Tax Return and, Probability of Receiving the 
Working Family Credit.  Examining for Differences Between Urban and Rural Areas. 
 Receives the Credit (Working Family Credit) 
Files an Individual Income 




 Only Eligible Households 
(N=208,228) 
Variable 
(1)            (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MSP       0.485***  0.556***  0.340***  0.404***  0.069  0.103 
  (0.034)           
               
           
             
           
 
       
        
          
     
      
       
             
        
         
     
         
       
             
           
           
(0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.068) (0.068)
SMETRO 
 
0.373*** 0.475*** 0.342*** 0.427*** 0.133* 0.154**
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.058) (0.058)
NONMETRO
 

















  18.872*** 
 
  -13.327   
(0.857) (0.871) (13.394)
MAX1     
 









  (0.027) (0.026) (0.097)
RATE2    
 
2.836    -22.369*** 
 




MAX2     
 























(0.017)  (0.017)  (0.029)
REFORM98
 
1.345*** 0.601*** 0.827*** 0.199*** -0.111 -0.033
(0.139) (0.015) (0.146) (0.014) (0.261)
 
(0.020)
REFORM99 -0.353*** -0.317*** -0.296*** -0.016 0.006 0.036*  36
             
               
           
               
     
               
 
             
 
               
 
               
 
               
 
               
           
               
     
               
           
           
           
     
     
           
     
               
     
           
   
(0.059) (0.013) (0.056) (0.013) (0.132) (0.016)
FEMALE 
 
0.204*** 0.200*** 0.212*** 0.209*** 0.604*** 0.601***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016)





































































  (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
AGECH   
 
0.018*** 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.005** 0.006***










(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
MARRIED
 
0.373*** 0.370*** 0.398*** 0.396*** 0.231*** 0.228***





7.262*** 9.214*** 4.885*** 6.705*** 0.505 1.049*
(0.270) (0.251) (0.275) (0.256) (0.529)
 
(0.517)









































  (0.088) (0.023) (0.093) (0.023) (0.516) (0.050)
*  significant at the 0.05 level 
**  significant at the 0.01 level 
***significant at the 0.001 level 
  
Table 6.  Estimated Coefficients to a Logistic Regression on the Probability a Household Files a Minnesota Income Tax Return:    






























(N=153,094)   Variable  
(1)                (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MAXCRED   0.766***  0.912***  0.619***  0.665***             
   (0.027)  (0.044)  (0.047)  (0.031)             
RATE1                 33.547***  28.245***  20.087***  20.749*** 
               (1.383)  (2.199)  (2.213)  (1.622) 
MAX1                  2.468***  0.735**  2.099***  0.878*** 
               (0.168)  (0.282)  (0.3)  (0.203) 
WFCFLOOR              -0.279***  -0.286***  -0.102  -0.226*** 
               (0.038)  (0.073)  (0.078)  (0.057) 
RATE2                 5.488  -11.795  5.875  -13.984 
               (7.968)  (15.535)  (16.52)  (11.672) 
MAX2                  5.285***  5.661  3.17  5.58* 
               (1.586)  (3.086)  (3.283)  (2.317) 
PHOUTFL               0.073***  0.049***  0.004  0.012 
               (0.009)  (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.009) 
PHOUTRT               -105.008***  -47.228***  -77.956***  -44.415*** 
               (4.48)  (7.268)  (7.852)  (5.208) 
REFORM98
   
                 
               
                 
               
                     
               
         
               
                   
               
                 
               
                   
               
0.69*** 0.316*** 0.723*** 0.444*** 1.598*** 1.687*** 0.782 1.516***
(0.022) (0.038) (0.041) (0.028) (0.201) (0.38) (0.41) (0.309)
REFORM99
   
-0.446*** -0.196*** -0.208*** -0.125*** -0.451*** -0.391* -0.209 -0.332**
(0.018) (0.038) (0.039) (0.027) (0.084) (0.156) (0.169) (0.121)
FEMALE
   
0.352*** 0.200*** 0.022 0.119*** 0.358*** 0.204*** 0.025 0.12***
(0.017) (0.029) (0.024) (0.017) (0.017) (0.029) (0.024) (0.017)
ASIAN    
   
-0.013  -0.052  0.039  -0.258*** -0.029 -0.058 0.029 -0.277***
(0.016) (0.050) (0.044) (0.048) (0.016) (0.050) (0.044) (0.048)
AFRICAN
   
-0.372*** -0.406*** -0.511*** -0.455*** -0.372*** -0.423*** -0.53*** -0.476***
(0.010) (0.034) (0.041) (0.050) (0.010) (0.034) (0.041) (0.049)
HISPANIC
   
-0.065** -0.265*** -0.684*** -0.573*** -0.072** -0.272*** -0.687*** -0.581***
(0.023) (0.049) (0.027) (0.019) (0.023) (0.049) (0.027) (0.019)
AMERIND
   
-0.94*** -0.487*** -1.052*** -1.531*** -0.938*** -0.495*** -1.055*** -1.542***
(0.019) (0.052) (0.035) (0.020) (0.019) (0.052) (0.035) (0.020) 
EDUCLHS
   
                   
               
                   
               
                       
               
                     
               
                   
               
               
               
                 
               
-0.64*** -0.524*** -0.609*** -0.533*** -0.646*** -0.533*** -0.615*** -0.538***
(0.010) (0.018) (0.020) (0.013) (0.010) (0.018) (0.020) (0.013)
NCHTIME
   
-0.087*** -0.168*** -0.081*** -0.08*** -0.077*** -0.132*** -0.064*** -0.056***
(0.003) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005)
AGECH
   
0.025*** 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.023*** 0.013*** 0.018*** 0.014***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
AGEPAR
   
-0.006*** -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.006*** -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
MARRIED
   
0.392*** 0.324*** 0.399*** 0.357*** 0.394*** 0.325*** 0.405*** 0.362***
(0.011) (0.019) (0.018) (0.012) (0.011) (0.019) (0.018) (0.012)
PCALLJMW
   
  8.856*** 3.389*** 5.527*** 0.007 6.947*** 2.428*** 5.543*** 0.004
(0.284) (0.331) (0.314) (0.155) (0.392) (0.343) (0.353) (0.155)
Constant
   
-1.166*** -0.037 -0.191*** 0.358*** -1.697*** -0.715** 0.132 0.231
(0.029) (0.055) (0.047) (0.033) (0.152) (0.243) (0.202) (0.154)
*  significant at the 0.05 level 
**  significant at the 0.01 level 






Table 7.  Estimated Coefficients to Logistic Regressions on the Probability a Household Receives Minnesota’s Working Family Credit: 

































                 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  
MAXCRED   0.88***  0.955***  0.77***  0.778***               
   (0.027)  (0.043)  (0.046)  (0.03)               
RATE1                 25.711***  20.618***  13.75***  15.373***   
               (1.431)  (2.209)  (2.233)  (1.615)   
MAX1                  1.512***  0.291  1.419***  0.61**   
               (0.174)  (0.284)  (0.303)  (0.202)   
WFCFLOOR              -0.319***  -0.206**  -0.099  -0.183***   
               (0.039)  (0.07)  (0.076)  (0.053)   
RATE2                 -29.599***  -18.303  -5.631  -20.39   
               (7.843)  (14.471)  (15.436)  (10.857)   
MAX2                  9.739***  5.392  3.669  5.758**   
               (1.563)  (2.879)  (3.074)  (2.157)   
PHOUTFL               0.047***  0.032*  -0.003  0.012   
               (0.010)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.010)   
PHOUTRT               -59.695***  -20.602**  -42.723***  -24.216***   
               (4.665)  (7.44)  (7.981)  (5.234)   
REFORM98
   
               
             
                 
             
                   
             
       
             
         
             
0.235*** -0.013 0.282*** 0.162*** 1.148*** 0.777* 0.408 0.825**   
(0.022) (0.036) (0.039) (0.027) (0.219) (0.378) (0.424) (0.289)   
REFORM99
   
-0.008 0.000 0.028 -0.038 -0.357*** -0.248 -0.08 -0.301**  
(0.018) (0.035) (0.037) (0.025) (0.083) (0.145) (0.157) (0.112)   
FEMALE
   
0.384*** 0.255*** 0.043 0.121*** 0.389*** 0.258*** 0.046 0.122***   
(0.018) (0.029) (0.024) (0.017) (0.018) (0.029) (0.024) (0.017)   
ASIAN    
   
-0.135***  -0.125*  -0.019  -0.362*** -0.154*** -0.131** -0.027 -0.378***   
(0.017) (0.051) (0.044) (0.049) (0.017) (0.051) (0.044) (0.049)   
AFRICAN  
   
-0.171***  -0.18***  -0.386***  -0.371*** -0.167*** -0.194*** -0.396*** -0.387***  
(0.010) (0.034) (0.042) (0.050) (0.010) (0.034) (0.042) (0.050)    
HISPANIC
   
               
             
         
             
         
             
         
             
             
       
             
                 
             
                 
             
               
             
0.038 -0.135** -0.527*** -0.436*** 0.028 -0.14** -0.533*** -0.442***   
(0.023) (0.049) (0.027) (0.019) (0.023) (0.049) (0.027) (0.019)   
AMERIND  
   
-0.807***  -0.426***  -0.939***  -1.365*** -0.799*** -0.432*** -0.943*** -1.373***  
(0.020) (0.054) (0.036) (0.020) (0.020) (0.054) (0.036) (0.020)   
EDUCLHS  
   
-0.645***  -0.5***  -0.573***  -0.503*** -0.649*** -0.506*** -0.577*** -0.506***  
(0.010) (0.019) (0.020) (0.013) (0.010) (0.019) (0.020) (0.013)   
NCHTIME  
   
-0.076***  -0.127***  -0.054***  -0.048*** -0.066*** -0.096*** -0.039*** -0.029***  
(0.003) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005)   
AGECH    
   
0.03***  0.023***  0.021***  0.019***  0.028***  0.023***  0.021***  0.019***   
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)   
AGEPAR   
   
-0.01***  -0.009***  -0.007***  -0.008*** -0.01*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008***   
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)   
MARRIED
   
0.397*** 0.369*** 0.422*** 0.397*** 0.399*** 0.371*** 0.426*** 0.401***   
(0.011) (0.019) (0.018) (0.012) (0.011) (0.019) (0.018) (0.012)   
PCALLJMW
   
5.936*** 2.673*** 3.767*** -0.066 2.988*** 1.793*** 3.387*** -0.087  
(0.29) (0.327) (0.313) (0.154) (0.4) (0.34) (0.35) (0.155)   
Constant
   
-1.333*** -0.743*** -0.641*** -0.237*** -1.757*** -1.3*** -0.434* -0.455**   
(0.03) (0.055) (0.047) (0.033) (0.162) (0.256) (0.21) (0.159)   
*  significant at the 0.05 level 
**  significant at the 0.01 level 
***significant at the 0.001 level 
  
 
Table 8.  Estimated Coefficients to a Logistic Regression on the Probability a Household Receives Minnesota’s Working Family Credit: 






























(N=153,094)  Variables 
(1)              (2) (3) (4) (6) (6) (7) (8)
MAXCRED   0.588***  0.632***  0.504***  0.41***             
   (0.041)  (0.08)  (0.087)  (0.058)             
RATE1                 -32.304  54.486  31.744  -33.618 
               (19.16)  (36.825)  (42.237)  (26.271) 
MAX1                  19.132***  -7.231  -4.249  10.135 
               (4.372)  (8.362)  (9.708)  (5.982) 
WFCFLOOR              -48.886***  0.079  0.134  -0.424* 
               (11.420)  (0.267)  (0.310)  (0.187) 
RATE2                 38.03***  -9.787  -12.587  -30.058 
               (7.017)  (20.998)  (23.565)  (15.594) 
MAX2                  -0.784***       
               
               
               
               
               
               
         
               
                 
              
         
-6.079 -2.87 19.137*
               (0.14)  (13.337)  (15.453)  (9.593) 
PHOUTFL               0.36**  -0.191  -0.233  0.315 
               (0.124)  (0.239)  (0.276)  (0.163) 
PHOUTRT               -564.117***  182.263  120.302  -273.742 
               (118.418)  (226.245)  (263.099)  (161.963) 
  REFORM98
   
0.061* -0.225*** -0.127* -0.055 -0.145 -0.101 -0.819 0.338
(0.029) (0.051) (0.058) (0.039) (0.386) (0.789) (0.743) (0.491)
REFORM99
   
  0.081*** -0.007 0.085 -0.053 0.23 -0.587 -0.403 0.113
(0.024) (0.043) (0.047) (0.031) (0.193) (0.356) (0.413) (0.257)
FEMALE   
   
0.785***  0.663***  0.448***  0.421***  0.792***  0.666***  0.448***  0.422*** 
(0.026) (0.045) (0.04) (0.028) (0.026) (0.045) (0.04) (0.028)
ASIAN    
   
0.802***  0.273**  0.429***  0.299**  0.782***  0.274**  0.426***  0.296** 
(0.035) (0.095) (0.09) (0.099) (0.035) (0.095) (0.09) (0.099)
AFRICAN  
   
-0.313***  -0.247***  -0.457***  -0.25*** -0.308*** -0.249*** -0.461*** -0.253***
(0.015) (0.050) (0.06) (0.073) (0.016) (0.050) (0.06) (0.073)
HISPANIC
   
-0.032 -0.21** -0.378*** -0.499*** -0.031 -0.211** -0.376*** -0.5***
(0.037) (0.074) (0.048) (0.03) (0.037) (0.074) (0.048) (0.03)
AMERIND   -0.885***  -0.483***  -0.845***  -1.543*** -0.88*** -0.483*** -0.843*** -1.545*** 
                  
         
               
         
               
               
               
           
               
           
               
                 
               
(0.029) (0.08) (0.059) (0.03) (0.029) (0.08) (0.059) (0.03)
EDUCLHS  
   
-0.419***  -0.442***  -0.419***  -0.398*** -0.421*** -0.441*** -0.42*** -0.397***
(0.015) (0.03) (0.034) (0.022) (0.015) (0.03) (0.034) (0.022)
NCHTIME  
   
-0.035***  -0.09***  -0.019  -0.015 -0.021*** -0.076*** -0.02 -0.012
(0.006) (0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.006) (0.017) (0.016) (0.010)
AGECH    
   
0.004*  0.014***  0.007  0.001  0.004  0.013***  0.007  0.001 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
AGEPAR   
   
0.019***  0.019***  0.022***  0.020***  0.019***  0.020***  0.022***  0.021*** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
MARRIED
   
    0.261*** 0.212*** 0.225***  0.191***  0.263*** 0.215*** 0.225*** 0.192***
(0.017) (0.032) (0.033) (0.021) (0.017) (0.032) (0.033) (0.021)
PCALLJMW
   
  0.97 0.632 2.315***  -1.262***  0.004 0.798 2.532*** -1.35***
(0.542) (0.565) (0.653) (0.388) (0.568) (0.585) (0.732) (0.391)
Constant
   
-1.114*** -0.68*** -0.583*** -0.075 2.33** -2.302 -0.174 0.277
(0.06) (0.097) (0.094) (0.061) (0.739) (1.551) (1.483) (1.010)
*  significant at the 0.05 level 
**  significant at the 0.01 level 
***significant at the 0.001 level 
 
   
 
Table 9.  Change in Household Filing Rates and Receipt Rates of Working Family Credit with 












Filing an Income Tax Return          
Central Minneapolis-St. Paul Counties  57.4% 59.4%  3.4% 
Suburban Minneapolis-St. Paul Counties  67.7% 69.6%  2.9% 
Smaller Metropolitan Areas  66.8% 68.2%  2.0% 
Rural Counties  65.3% 66.7%  2.2% 
 
Receiving the Working Family Credit          
Central Minneapolis-St. Paul Counties  51.7% 54.1%  4.5% 
Suburban Minneapolis-St. Paul Counties  55.9% 58.3%  4.2% 
Smaller Metropolitan Areas  58.4% 60.3%  3.2% 
Rural Counties  56.5% 58.4%  3.3% 
 
Receiving the Working Family Credit  
Among Eligible Parents          
Central Minneapolis-St. Paul Counties  67.4% 68.8%  2.0% 
Suburban Minneapolis-St. Paul Counties  67.6% 69.0%  2.0% 
Smaller Metropolitan Areas  71.3% 72.3%  1.4% 
Rural Counties  68.0% 68.9%  1.3% 
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Appendix:  Calculation of the Working Family Credit 
Calculation of the credit depends upon the household’s earned income, the number of 
children, and the tax year.  Prior to the 1998 reform, the credit consisted of three stages:  a phase-
in range, a maximum credit, and a phase-out range.  Post 1998, there were five stages.   
1.  The phase-in:  
w WFC × = RATE1  (1) 
where RATE1 is the phase-in rate, w is earnings, and WFC is the Working Family Credit 
amount.  
2.   The maximum allowable credit for tier one. 
{ w WFC × ≤ = RATE1 MAX1 | MAX1 }  (2) 
where MAX1 equals the tier one maximum credit.   
3.  The phase-in to the second tier.   
{} w w WFC ≤ − + = WFCFLOOR | ) WFCFLOOR ( RATE2 MAX1  (3) 
where RATE2 equals the phase-in rate for the second tier and WFCFLOOR equals the phase-in 
floor to the second tier.   
4.  The maximum allowable amount for tier two. 
{ ) WFCFLOOR ( RATE2 MAX1 MAX2 | MAX2 } − + ≤ = w WFC  (4) 
where MAX2 equals the tier-two maximum credit.   







≥ − − ≥
− −
=
0 ) PHOUTFL ( PHOUTRT MAX2     PHOUTFL
| ) PHOUTFL ( PHOUTRT MAX2
w and w
w
WFC    (5)   45
where PHOUTFL equals the phase-out floor and PHOUTRT equals the phase-out rate.  Once the 
credit reaches zero, households are no longer eligible.   
Below are example credit calculations for a family with two dependents in tax year 1999.  
The credit parameters are as follows:  (1) the phase-in rate for tier one equals 0.088; (2) the 
maximum credit for tier one equals $908; (3) the phase-in floor for tier two equals $15,769, and 
the phase-in rate equals 0.2; (4) the maximum credit for tier two equals $1,321; and (5) the 
phase-out floor equals $18,990, with a phase-out rate of 0.0988.
19
•  If the family earned $5,000, the credit equals $440 (=.088x$5,000). 
•  If the family earned $15,000, the family receives the tier-one maximum credit of $908. 
•  If the family earned $17,500, the credit equals $1,254 (=$908+0.2 ($17,500-$15,769)).   
•  If the family earned $18,500, the family receives the tier-two maximum credit of $1,321. 
•  Finally, if the family earned $20,000, the credit equals $1,226 (=$1,321- 0.0938 
($20,000-$18,990)). 
                                                 
19 The maximum credit for tier 1, phase-in floor to tier 2, the maximum credit for tier 2, and the phase-out floor are 
all in 2002 dollars. 